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It is estimated that only 5% of musicians in Italy are regularly employed. In an attempt at 
understanding such a peculiar situation, we build a theoretical model of the musicians’ labour 
market in which we embed the main institutional features of the Italian system. We notice 
how the presence of taxation incentivates the formation of a black market for musicians and 
discourages talented agents from becoming full-time musicians in all second-best economies. 
In Italy both tendencies are particularly strong, and further exacerbated by the presence of an 
actuarially unfair pension system for musicians. These inefficiencies might be corrected by a 
two-fold policy: the reform of the pension system, and the introduction of a sufficiently large 
unemployment benefit for musicians. We notice that the first step, while highly desirable, is 
unlikely to be politically feasible in the current Italian institutional setting. The second step, 
which has a general interest for any second-best economy, is instead viable under certain 
circumstances. 
JEL Code: J44, Z11. 
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When the words "black" and "music" appear in the same sentence, the most obvious guess is
that someone is using a politically incorrect term for "Afro-American music" (say, jazz or blues).
However, a much more likely subject in Italy would be the situation of the musicians￿labour
market. Estimates of the Italian musicians￿union (Sindacato Italiano Artisti della Musica)1
put the percentage of Italian musicians who work entirely or partially on the shadow market
at an average of 95% for the last few years; the remaining 5% are either employed as classical
musicians (about 1.5%) or have enough bargaining power (because of their success) to earn a
living as self-employed pop artists (about 3.5%). While there are, to the best of my knowledge,
no hard data on the subject, it seems reasonable to believe that, as is often the case in Italian
labour markets, people tend to be stuck on whatever side they happen to land at the beginning
of their career: if they manage to get a regular job early on, they are likely to keep it for the rest
of their lives, otherwise they tend to stay in the black market for as long as they are willing to
work as musicians. This is at least what casual observation suggests, and also what the union
claims.
Now, it is true that the shadow economy is an important feature of the Italian society:
Schneider and Este (2002) estimate its size at about one quarter of GDP in the ￿ 90, to be
compared with an average of 12% for developed countries as a whole. Still, a labour market for
a perfectly legal job that is almost entirely irregular is something worth our attention. In this
note, we strive to understand the forces that have led to such a peculiar situation. In order to
do so, we build a theoretical model in which we embed the main institutional features of the
Italian system ￿in particular, social security. We identify, within a second-best setting, a natural
tendency for the musicians￿labour market to split into a regular part and an irregular one, and
point out that in Italy prominent institutional features exacerbate, rather than compensate,
this tendency. This way, we are able to explain the overwhelming prevalence of the black labour
market in the case of musicians, and also to point out the policy reforms needed to reverse this
state of a⁄airs. We discuss how the reforms might a⁄ect social welfare and whether they are
politically feasible. We notice that the most promising policy instrument is a unemployment
bene￿t for full-time musicians; under certain circumstances, raising such a bene￿t may turn
out to be Pareto-improving because it induces more talented individuals to choose a career
1See the union￿ s website, www.sindacatomusicisti.it, accessed January 2009; the site is in Italian.
2as regular, full-time musicians, and the revenue raised from taxing the income of these new
musicians might then more than o⁄set the increased revenue requirement. Although the model
is geared to interpret the Italian situation, we identify some insights that have general validity
for any musicians￿labour market. Our analysis applies to other workers in the entertainment
industry, e.g. actors.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide the institutional and theoretical
background. Section 3 illustrates our modelling strategy. Section 4 includes the analysis and
the main results. Section 5 rounds o⁄ the paper with a ￿nal discussion.
II Background
In our model, individuals are partitioned into two groups, those who do not have talent for
becoming musicians, work in an ordinary labour market and purchase music, and those who
happen to have such a talent (which we take to be exogenously given ￿more on this later).
The talented agents may decide to become full-time self-employed musicians or to enter the
ordinary labour market, work full-time there, and also part-time as musicians.2 Notice that,
while in principle anybody can handle two jobs, it is de￿nitely easier for musicians and other
workers in the entertainment industry, because the working hours of an ordinary job and a
musician￿ s job are compatible: people want to be entertained in their free time, that is at night,
during the week-end or the summer holidays. Hence, although the arguments that we develop
in what follows could be applied to other situations, they make sense especially for the case of
entertainment workers.3
In principle, both jobs could be regular, but there are obvious incentives to keep one on
the shadow market; the ￿rst job is enough to gain access to several welfare services, and given
the progressivity of the tax system, the extra-income from the second job would be relatively
modest. Since the income ￿ ow of a musician is bound to be highly erratic relative to that of an
ordinary worker, due to such things as the vagaries of musical tastes or the competition from
DJ￿ s and others who use pre-recorded music, it generally makes sense to keep the employment
2We are not interested here in the superstar phenomenon (originally studied by Rosen 1981 and Adler 1985
and then generalised to non-artistic labour markets by Frank and Cook 1995); we consider all musicians to be
"normal" ones. Casual observation as well as the data we cited above suggest that this is a safe modelling
strategy, as only a tiny percentage of musicians become superstars.
3Most of what we say about musicians would be true for other artists, e.g. actors.
3as musician in the shadow market. We will later illustrate the conditions under which agents
actually prefer to go black, and argue that they are often satis￿ed in the Italian context. Of
course, there are limitations to what a moonlighting musician can do ￿for example, touring is
going to be more di¢ cult, due to the demands of the "day job". We will take this into account
in the model by the simple expedient of assuming that there are less days available for working
as a musician when one is in the shadow market. Another simpli￿cation is that we rule out the
possibility of black markets for ordinary jobs.
The institutional features4
As we will argue later, the tendency of musicians to work on the shadow market is, at least
potentially, present in any second best economy. In Italy, it is compounded by the peculiar
features of the welfare system for the workers in the entertainment industry, especially the fact
that pension contributions for any particular year are lost if a musician does not work at least
120 days in that year. Abstracting for a moment from the possibility of ￿scal inspections, if a
musician is uncertain as to the number of days she will have the opportunity to work, then she
will only pay the contributions if she estimates a su¢ ciently large likelihood that this number
is higher than 120; otherwise, she would rather go "black". For example, if a musician works
only at week-ends, there are at most 104 days available; obviously, the individual might decide
not to moonlight only if tax inspectors constitute a real danger (which is generally not the case
in Italy). It is true that a musician is entitled to a (modest) unemployment bene￿t if she works
less then 78 days in one year, but the gap between 78 and 120 is rather large and the incentives
to moonlight remain basically the same: working for 104 days, one loses both the bene￿t and
the pension contributions. Also, unlike all other workers in Italy, employees or self-employed,
musicians do not have access to a publicly subsidised insurance system, despite the fact that
the stage is an obviously dangerous working place. This hardly quali￿es as a workers￿welfare
system; perhaps those who designed it shared the view of the anonymous character in the Dire
Straits song "Money for nothing", who wistfully notices of musicians that "...them guys ain￿ t
dumb...that ain￿ t working, that￿ s the way you do it, get your money for nothing..."
4This subsection includes a brief description of the italian welfare system for musicians that is based on the
information given on the ENPALS￿ s website, www.enpals.it, accessed January 2009. Also this site is in Italian.
ENPALS (Ente Nazionale di Previdenza e Assistenza per i Lavoratori dello Spettacolo) is the agency that manages
social security for all workers in the entertainment industry.
4It is worth remarking that the rules concerning public pensions in Italy impose that the
bene￿t paid to the retired worker is directly related to the total amount of contributions. The
system is of the "pay-as-you-go" variety, but, starting from 1995, the bene￿ts are computed
according to a formula that mimics the fully-funded systems; the total amount of contributions,
plus the interests paid by the State,5 determine the total amount of bene￿ts, and the yearly
bene￿t is given by this total amount divided by the number of years a person is expected to
live as a pensioner. This makes the fact that pension contributions for musicians are only
valid conditional on a minimum number of worked days extremely peculiar. A year in which a
musician works little would add little to the total pension bene￿ts to which he or she is entitled,
but still it is unclear why he or she should be made to lose the contributions. Possibly, the
idea is to force a person into a career ￿either you are a full-time musician, and then you are
entitled to the social security services, or you should de￿nitely leave the music world, and go
for an ordinary job. As it happens, the outcome is that most talented individuals do go for an
ordinary job, but moonlight as musicians.
Finally, we notice that, whatever the origin of these peculiar arrangements, there are now
strong interests against any change of the status quo. There are obvious positive ￿nancial
consequences for the institution managing the pension system when a substantial share of the
workers pay contributions but do not get bene￿ts. As a matter of fact, in Italy musicians and
other workers in the entertainment industry have their social security system managed by a
separate agency (ENPALS, see fn. 4), that in these latest years has been using (or trying to
use) the extra-revenue from the "lost" contributions to help cover the expenses for the current
pensions, computed before the 1995 reform with a very generous formula that did not take the
amount of paid contributions into account. It is clearly in the interest of the management of
ENPALS to keep the current state of a⁄airs unchanged, as long as they are able to enforce
the payment of contributions also from musicians who work less then 120 days per year (and
possibly more than 78). The musicians￿union￿ s main charge against ENPALS is in fact that
the latter redistributes resources away from the currently working musicians towards current
pensioners ￿with the aggravating circumstance that the latter come mostly from the elite of
employed classical musicians or successful pop artists. At a more general level, we can also
point out that the current pension system for musicians is, unlike the one prevailing for all
5The interests paid each year cover the in￿ ation rate plus a spread proportional to the rate of growth of
national income. For a detailed presentation of the Italian pension system after 1995, see Sartor (2001).
5other workers, actuarially unfair, that is it implies an expected bene￿t which is less than the
contributions paid.
Models of artists￿labour market
Apart from the superstar models referred to in fn. 2, which we do not consider for the reasons
given there, another dominant paradigm in the modelisation of artists￿labour markets is the
work-preference approach pioneered by Throsby (1994) ￿see also Cowen and Tabarrok (2000)
and Caserta and Cuccia (2001) for subsequent developments. As is well-known, these models
postulate that artists have special utility functions. Unlike other workers, who derive utility
only from their net income/consumption, artists gain utility also by working in their artistic
occupation. Since their earnings from this occupation are however generally low and somewhat
erratic, artists allocate their time partly to utility-generating but poorly paid artistic work, and
partly to disutility-generating but better paid non-artistic work. Given the assumed preference
structure, this behaviour is of course perfectly rational and indeed risk-minimising.
In the present paper, as mentioned, we assume that artist have a special talent for music. It
is understood, although not explicitly modelled, that the special talent is acquired through some
form of education and training. To keep the model simple, we treat the talent as exogenous, but
the reader should keep in mind that, behind the scenes, there has been a stage of human capital
accumulation. Unlike the work-preference model, no intrinsic reward is associated to composing
or performing music. However, the two modelling strategies are basically equivalent in their
predictions, most notably both plausibly describe artists as having more than one occupation.
We have chosen the present version because it is more amenable to the tax/bene￿t analysis that
is crucial to our reasoning.
III A model of the musicians￿labour market in Italy
We employ an extremely simple overlapping generations model. Consider a population whose
total size (constant over periods) is normalised to unity; a share ￿ of the individuals are un-
talented, whereas the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ are endowed with a talent for music. In the ￿-group,
individuals are di⁄erentiated by an ability parameter, which we normalise as being equal to the
￿xed per-period income he or she earns on the ordinary labour market; income is continuously
distributed on the support (w￿;w+) and f (w) is the corresponding distribution function. Also
the agents in the (1 ￿ a)-group are di⁄erentiated by the same ability parameter, now equal to
6the ￿xed income they could earn on the ordinary market, should they decide not to work as
full-time musicians; the support is the same, and the distribution function is g (w). The share
of agents who combine the ordinary and the musician￿ s job is denoted ￿; the share of full-time
musicians is instead ￿ ￿of course, ￿ +￿ = 1￿￿. Agents live for 2 periods, working in the ￿rst,
and spending the second as pensioners; we use in fact a slightly modi￿ed version of the usual
life-cycle model, often employed for studying intertemporal policy issues. In each period, there
are two generations alive, one of workers and the other of pensioners. The economy replicates
itself unvaryingly period after period; hence, we will not use a generation index in our notation
below.
Ordinary workers
Non-musicians consume a composite good c in periods 1 and 2; for simplicity, we take it that
they only consume m in period 2.6 The composite good is produced in a perfectly competitive
industry, with linear technology and labour as the only (variable) input; the production price is
normalised to unity. Music is only produced and consumed as live shows and it is measured in
days (one day=one show). The price ￿ of a music show is endogenous; at this stage, however, we
consider the behaviour of the agents once it has been agreed upon, and later we will illustrate
how it is determined (the usual backward solution strategy). Notice that m takes discrete values,
and we take it to be outside the choice of the consumer: to rationalise this, we assume that
agents cannot control neither the number of shows that are interesting for them (that depends
of course on the schedules of the artists) nor the number of the ones they can actually attend
among those (unforeseeable circumstances like bad weather or illnesses may force them not to
go). As a further simpli￿cation, we take m to be the same for all agents. This latter point is in
fact inessential and is only meant to save on notation; the crucial assumption is the exogeneity
of m, not that fact that it is equal for all. The role of the exogeneity assumption is to simplify
the derivation of the musicians￿income from their activity; by keeping the number of attended
shows ￿xed, we can more easily model the endogenous determination of the price at which the
tickets for the shows are sold (and thus of the earnings of the musicians).
The agent￿ s gross income is simply w. Disposable income, though, depends on the impact
6As pensioners have more free-time than working adults, it is not too far-fetched to think of them as the only
ones who consume music. At the expense of some additional complexity, we could include also adults in this
category.
7of policy; we consider two forms of public intervention: redistributive taxation and pensions.
At this stage of the analysis, the reason why these policy instruments have come into being is
immaterial ￿they might have been imposed by a benevolent dictator, or generated by a political
process. All that matters is that they are in place, and constrain the agents￿behaviour. We
choose the simplest possible form of second-best redistributive taxation, the linear income tax,
made of a constant marginal income tax rate t > 0 and a uniform lump-sum subsidy T > 0.
The gross tax liability increases at a constant pace with income, while the subsidy is the same
for everybody, so that high-income agents pay into the system more than they get out of it;
this makes the linear income tax a simple but e⁄ective approximation of real-world progressive
tax systems. The lump-sum subsidy, in particular plays the role of what in the real-world are
tax allowances. Notice that since income is ￿xed, the marginal tax rate does not distort the
time allocation; however, as we shall see, it may distort the occupational choice for musicians.7
Also, agents have to pay for their pensions, and we take ￿ to be the proportional rate of pension
contribution. The ￿rst period budget constraint is thus
c1
ow + sow = (1 ￿ t ￿ ￿)w + T: (1)
where the superscript denotes the period, the subscript denotes the agent type (ow for ordinary
worker) and s are savings. Once retired, the agent￿ s disposable income equals his pension bene￿t
plus the returns from his savings. Since national income is constant over time, and there is no
in￿ ation,8 the pension bene￿t, computed according to the Italian method described above, is
￿w; that is, it equals the contribution paid. The pension system simply shifts consumption from
one period to the next.9 The second period budget constraint, with r denoting the interest rate,
is
c2
ow + ￿m = ￿w + (1 + r)sow; (2)















w + T: (3)
7On the income tax, its various forms, and its e⁄ects, see e.g. Myles (1995).
8Actually, this is not far from what has been actually happening in the last few years in Italy, where national
income has been almost stagnant, and in￿ ation has been rather modest.
9The coe¢ cient ￿ is assumed to give the net-of-taxes pension; this way, we simplify the notation by not
explicitly considering taxation in period 2.
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= (1 ￿ ￿)w + T: (5)
It is worth noting a feature of the model that plays a somewhat hidden role in shaping the
budget constraint. In order to be realistic, one has to assume that the pension system is of
the pay-as-you-go variety, that is current contributions are immediately employed to cover the
expenditure for current pensions. That being the case, it would not in general be true that
any single agent could get as a pension exactly what he had to remit in contributions and that
at the same time the budget of the social security agency could break even. In our case, it is
however true, because the economy replicates itself period after period without changing.
We postulate an extremely simple utility function for the ordinary workers, in which the
consumption of live music shows enters linearly, and the consumption levels of the composite








where ￿ is the utility (measured in consumption units) from an additional music show. This
modelling strategy is dictated by the opportunity to keep the model as uncluttered as possible
in all the aspects that are not central to the analysis. Using this utility function, we can derive
immediately the optimal consumption path of the agents, and, using the fact that the marginal
utility of a music show is ￿xed, we can approach the bargaining stage for the determination of
the musicians￿income in a straightforward way, as we shall see presently. No other property of
the model or result of the analysis is in any way dependent on the simpli￿ed utility function
that we use; in particular, the partition of the labour market between full-time and part-time
musicians that we derive later on stems exclusively from the assumption that only some agents
have a talent for music, and not at all from the form of the utility function.
We know that maximising (6) subject to (5) requires that c1
ow = c2
ow; letting cow denote the
common consumption level, is then easy to ￿nd that
cow =
￿








Substituting cow back into the utility function, we obtain an expression for the indirect utility,
which we express as a function of the policy variables, U￿ (t;T;￿). Using the envelope theorem













To further emphasise the limited impact that our choice for the utility function has on the
development of the model, we remark here that the signs of the above derivatives are valid for
all utility functions ￿only the speci￿c functional forms follow from our speci￿c utility function.
Of course, the results that we derive in Section 4 below only depend on the signs.
Full-time musicians









where i = fm;pm denotes a full-time or a part-time musician. Starting with the former, we take
it that the number of days a full-time musician works in the ￿rst period is a discrete random
variable that can take three values, da, da and dc, with probability pa, pb and pc; respectively;
we posit da > db > dc. The expected value is
￿ = pada + pbdb + pcdc: (10)
For each worked day, the musician earns x = n(￿ ￿ ￿) units of consumption good, where n
is the share of the untalented population that happens to attend the show and ￿ is the cost
of the show borne by the musician. So, total expected gross income in the ￿rst period is ￿x:
Expected net income depends on how policy interacts with the agent￿ s actions. A musician
pays the income tax and the pension contributions, and receives the subsidy, the same as the
ordinary worker; moreover, if he works dc days he is entitled to an unemployment bene￿t ￿
paid by the State. That is, we assume that the state provides a form of social insurance to
compensate the fact that the income of musicians is uncertain, unlike that of ordinary workers
(this captures an essential feature of the current situation in Italy, as described above). Thus,
the budget constraint in period 1 is
c1
fm + sfm = (1 ￿ t ￿ ￿)￿x + T + pc￿: (11)
As for the pension bene￿t, we assume that only if the agent works da days, its contributions
are valid towards the computation of the bene￿t (this again re￿ ects the current institutional
10setting in Italy). Thus, the pension bene￿t is given by ￿padax, and the budget constraint is
c2
fm = ￿padax + (1 + r)sfm:










The solution is identi￿ed by


























pc > 0: (14)
The same caveat as before applies: the signs are independent of the speci￿c utility function,
although the functional forms of course are not.
Part-time musicians
We assume that moonlighting is always a superior option to keep music as a regular second
job (later in this subsection we give the precise condition under which this occurs); given the
data we gave on the employment of musicians in Italy, this is clearly an empirically plausible
assumption. Thus, part-time musicians￿gross incomes are given by w plus what they earn on
the black market. We assume that moonlighting involves a cost, in that the agent must hide his
activity from the ￿sc. In the relevant literature, tax dodging is modelled either as avoidance (a
costly but riskless activity) or evasion (risky because of tax inspections and consequent ￿nes)
￿see e.g. Cowell (1990b). We use the avoidance approach, following Slemrod (2001) among
others, because it is analytically simpler; in our case, however, we do not interpret avoidance
literally as depicting a situation in which there are no chances to be discovered once the cost
is incurred, but as a reduced form of the evasion approach. To do so, we think of the cost of
avoidance as the "monetary amount that the person would just be prepared to pay in order to be
guaranteed that he will get away with evasion" (Cowell, 1990a, p. 232 ￿see also Balestrino and
Galmarini, 2003), thereby converting a problem of choice under uncertainty into an equivalent
one under certainty. Finally, notice that the cost of avoidance depends, in principle, also on
11policy: the government decides how much e⁄ort to put into the enforcement of the tax code.
We will not particularly pursue this line of enquiry in the paper, letting enforcement be ￿xed
at some exogenous level for most of the analysis; however, we refer occasionally to what might
happen if enforcement could be controlled.
Thus, we let d be the number of days a part-time musician can work on the black market,
and k(d) be an increasing and strictly convex function describing the cost of moonlighting.
Then, gross income in the working period is
w + dx ￿ k(d): (15)
Taking into account the policy instruments, the budget constraint is
c1
pm + spm = (1 ￿ t ￿ ￿)w + T + dx ￿ k(d): (16)
Since pension bene￿ts are computed as for ordinary workers, the constraint in the second period
is
c2
pm = ￿w + (1 + r)spm: (17)






= (1 ￿ ￿)w + T + dx ￿ k(d): (18)
It turns out to be convenient to interpret the part-time musicians￿maximisation problem as
a two-step process; ￿rst, they choose the optimal number of moonlighting days, that is they
maximise their total income; given this, they choose their intertemporal consumption allocation.
The ￿rst step is characterised by the ￿rst order condition
x = k0;
we let d￿ = d(x) be the optimal number of moonlighting days; given that the cost function
k(d) is independent of w, d￿ does not vary across agents. Maximised lifetime income is thus
(1 ￿ ￿)w + T + d￿x ￿ k(d￿).
At this stage, we can rationalise the assumption that part-time musicians always moonlight
rather than having two regular jobs. Suppose that the largest number of worked days as a
musician compatible with the working schedule of the ordinary job is d; then, the net lifetime
income from the second job is (1 ￿ ￿)dx. We are assuming that
d￿x ￿ k(d￿) > (1 ￿ ￿)dx: (19)






= (1 ￿ ￿)w + T + d￿x ￿ k(d￿): (20)
The solution is

















Once again, we remark that the signs of these derivatives are independent of the functional form
of the utility function.
Bargaining over the price of a music show
We have now all the elements for investigating the determination of the price of a music show.
Our intent in making such price endogenous was to capture, simply but e⁄ectively, the way in
which a musician￿ s income is formed in the real world, where it would depend on how well he
manages to sell his or her shows. Of course, in the real world there are additional actors besides
the consumers and the producers of music, such as the musician￿ s agent and the owner of the
venue where the show is performed. In our simpli￿ed setup, we suppose that bargaining takes
places directly between the consumers and the musicians, dispensing with these intermediaries ￿
it would actually be easy to account for their role, but the model would only gain an additional
layer of complexity without generating any further insight. We have also built the model so as
to make this bargaining stage as simple as possible, in such a way that it generates the same
price for all possible consumer-musician interactions (that is, the price does not depend on the
consumer￿ s income).
Let us take then a typical situation in which an ordinary agent and a musician bargain over
the price of the show. If an agreement is found, the ordinary agent gains ￿ ￿ ￿ , whereas the
musician gains ￿ ￿￿; both have a fall-back positions of zero gains and zero losses if the bargain
is not struck (i.e. bargaining takes place before costs are incurred). Therefore, a simple Nash
solution is found by choosing ￿ so as to maximise
N = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ ; (23)
13where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the bargaining power of the buyer (the ordinary agent) and 1 ￿ ￿ the
bargaining power of the seller (the musician). The solution is
￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿; (24)
that is the price is a weighted average of the cost and of the marginal utility of a show, with the
weights given by the bargaining power parameters. For the model to work, we have to assume
that ￿ > ￿; so that ￿ necessarily falls between ￿ and ￿; this way, both buyer and seller have
something to gain from reaching an agreement.
Importantly, the price is directly proportional to the marginal utility ￿, which we can in-
terpret as the consumer￿ s willingness to pay for the show (it is in fact expressed in units of the
numeraire). We will argue that ￿ is relatively small, since musical tastes, in Italy like elsewhere,
are today biased towards the English-speaking world.10 Our contention is that the deep di⁄er-
ences existing between the two musical traditions imply that as consumers learn to appreciate
English/American music, their willingness to pay for listening to Italian music is reduced. In-
deed, Italian music is based on a tradition going back at least to the second half of the XVI
century, according to which songs are built along a melodic line with chord-based accompani-
ment (a melody is a sequence of notes; a chord is obtained instead when three or more notes
sound simultaneously). In these compositions, rhythm is relatively unimportant and largely
unvarying throughout the piece, whereas much importance is attached to the singer￿ s technical
abilities. Over the centuries, the songwriting, playing and singing styles have become uniquely
Italian inasmuch as the melodies have to adapt themselves to a country￿ s language. In the
XIX century Romantic musicians like Verdi also became nationalistic icons (for more on these
issues, see e.g. Gri¢ ths, 2006). Against this deeply rooted and value-laden tradition, in￿ uences
from the English-speaking world have brought to Italy jazz, blues, rock￿ n￿ roll, progressive rock,
electro-pop, disco music, rap, hip-hop and a variety of other genres and sub-genres, some more
sophisticated, other de￿nitely popular. For most of these genres, rhythm is key in terms of
what "makes the song", and even when melody matters, it will be a melody suitable for the
Anglo-Saxon language or perhaps left to an instrument as opposed to the vocal part. It is easy
to imagine that as the consumers get used to such a foreign musical style, they will not express
10In the context of our model, Anglo-Saxon music, that can be enjoyed e.g. by purchasing CD￿ s or music DVD￿ s
or attending shows from American or English singers/groups when their tours touch Italy or the limitrophe
countries, is included into the composite good c; we built the model in such a way that the willingness to pay ￿
concerns exclusively live shows by Italian musicians.
14a particularly large willingness to pay for Italian music: ￿ will be relatively low, and so will be
￿, and consequently the income that the musicians can earn from their shows.11
IV The labour market equilibrium and the role of policy
The labour market for ordinary workers presents no particular features. It is instead necessary
to determine the partition of musicians into full- and part-timers. From the way we set up
the optimisation problem of the two categories of agents, it is clear that a musician will work
part-time as long as the disposable income he enjoys exceeds the income he would have working
full-time (and viceversa). This follows because the two types of musicians have the same utility
function, and therefore their maximised utility will be higher the larger is their total income.
The partition of musicians in ￿rst and second best
In order to appreciate the peculiarity of the Italian institutional setting, we adopt a three-step
procedure. First, we establish a double benchmark by showing how the partition criterion would
work: i) in a laissez-faire situation, without policy, and ii) in a generic second-best setting in
which the pension system is actuarially fair also for musicians. Only then we consider the Italian
case.
In laissez-faire, the part-time work as musicians would not be intended as moonlighting,
but simply as a second job, and therefore the number of worked days would be the largest
compatible with the working schedule of the ordinary job, which we denoted above as d. A
part-time musicians would earn w + dx over his lifetime, and a full-time musician would earn
￿x; income would be shifted from one period to another through savings. The threshold ability
level would then be implicitly identi￿ed by







11One might argue that Italian musicians could learn to play and sing the way American or English musicians
do. In fact, this is what superstars often do: we have Neapolitan bluesmen, Tuscanian rappers, and so on. But
for the average musician the di¢ culties of learning a totally di⁄erent style of playing are often insurmountable
(the unusual rhythms of Anglo-Saxon music are for example a big hurdle).
15All talented agents with ability strictly greater than wLF would become part-time musicians,
and the remaining ones would become full-time musicians.12 Plausibly, ￿ > d, that is the
number of days a part-time musician can actually work is less than the number of days he









Clearly, the fraction of full-time musicians (i.e. ￿) increases with wLF; in this speci￿c case,
this implies that the larger is the di⁄erence between ￿ and d, the more musicians will choose
to become full-timers. This re￿ ects the fact that full-time musicians are those whose earning
ability on the ordinary market is lowest; if the possibility to supplement this ordinary income
with a second job is limited, then there is a strong incentive to become full-timers.
Let us consider now the partition of musicians in a generic second-best setting. Supposing
then that such a pension system works like the one operating in the ordinary labour market,
and more precisely that it is actuarially fair, the lifetime income of a full-time musician would
simply be
(1 ￿ ￿)￿x + T + pc￿: (28)
We should ￿nd the value of w for which this income equals that earned as part-time musician,
that is the value of w that solves
(1 ￿ ￿)￿x + T + pc￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)w + T + d￿x ￿ k(d￿); (29)
i.e.
wSB (t;￿;￿) = ￿x +
￿pc + k(d￿) ￿ d￿x
1 ￿ ￿
: (30)
Of course, wSB determines ￿SB and ￿SB just as wLF determines ￿LF and ￿LF ￿see above.
We emphasised that the threshold income depends on the policy instruments; for future use,






















12Those with ability e w are indi⁄erent between the two career options, and we assume that they choose to
become full-time musicians.
16Hence, marginally increasing the unemployment bene￿t has an unambiguously positive e⁄ect:
indeed, a larger unemployment bene￿t makes the career as full-time musician more appealing,
and therefore a larger number of talented agents will choose it. The e⁄ects of the income tax
rate t and of the pension contribution rate ￿ are in principle ambiguous: when either t or ￿
changes, it makes both career choices less interesting in absolute terms, but it also changes their
relative appeal. For this general second-best setting, it is possible to say which of the two e⁄ects
prevails: a rise in the tax or in the contribution rate rises the cut-o⁄income level, and therefore
makes a career as full-time musicians more appealing.
A question of some interest is to what extent policy distorts the e¢ cient partition of the
workers in the two musical careers relative to the e¢ cient laissez-faire solution. This is relevant
on at least two accounts. First, there is the general problem of the e¢ cient allocation of
resources: if there are too few or too many full-time musicians, then human capital is not being
used e¢ ciently, as there are agents who could do better by switching to another job. Second,
there is the speci￿c problem of tax avoidance: since in the second-best economy part-time
musicians hide a share of their income from the ￿sc, the partition of musicians matters in terms
of revenue ￿the more full-time musicians there are, the less revenue is lost.
To answer our question, we can simply compare wLF with wSB ￿the number of full-time









Notice that the l.h.s. of the second inequality in (34) is nothing but the "moonlighting condition"
(19) that we assumed to be valid in the Italian case. Supposing that the condition holds also
for this generic second-best economy, then the term is positive. Hence, the presence of a black
market works in the direction of making wLF larger than wSB ￿in other terms, it favours an
ine¢ ciently small number of full-time musicians. There are two ways in which this tendency can
be contrasted. First, we might have a relatively large unemployment bene￿t. Second, it might
be that moonlighting is too costly, e.g. because there are e⁄ective enforcement procedures that
rise k(d) up to the point where the moonlighting condition is no longer satis￿ed. We can thus
state:
Claim 1 In a second-best economy there are ine¢ ciently few full-time musicians if the black
market is accessible (i.e. the moonlighting condition holds) and the unemployment bene￿t is
small or indeed absent.
17The partition of musicians in the Italian labour market
Let us now move to the model that has been devised so as to capture the main institutional
features of the Italian situation. The identi￿cation of the threshold ability level requires again
that we consider the point at which the income from being a full-timer equals the income from
being a part-timer:
(1 ￿ t ￿ ￿)￿x + T + pc￿ +
￿padax
1 + r
= (1 ￿ ￿)w + T + d￿x ￿ k(d￿): (35)
This yields
wIT =
(1 ￿ t ￿ ￿)￿x + pc￿ +
￿padax
1+r + (k(d￿) ￿ d￿x)
1 ￿ ￿
: (36)
As we know, this means that only agents with ability less than wIT become full-time musicians;
￿IT and ￿IT are determined as above. Notice that the determination of the value of this
threshold (like those of the other thresholds) is also a⁄ected by the level of x, the income ￿ ow
accruing to the musician from each show. So far, we have not commented on its role, since
in the context of hypothetical ￿rst-best or second-best economies, we did not have any way to
guess its relative importance. However, in the case of Italy we have argued above that, due
to the competition from abroad, the price each consumer pays to attend the show is not likely
to be very large; hence, we expect x not to be large either. This clearly tends to discourage
musicians from becoming full-time professionals, and identi￿es a ￿rst factor in reducing the
absolute number of them in Italy.
A question that naturally comes to mind is whether the distortions encountered in the
general second-best case are reinforced in the Italian setting by the presence of the actuarially
unfair pension system. Predictably, the answer is positive. To see this, consider ￿rst that
the conditions of Claim (1) are naturally met in the Italian case; the moonlighting condition
is satis￿ed, and the unemployment bene￿t is small; thus, we expect that even without the
distortion induced by the pension system the group of full-time musicians would be ine¢ ciently
small. This latter distortion further complicates things: a comparison between the threshold
income for the case of Italy and that for the general second-best setting using (36) and (30),
yields, after a few manipulations,







The di⁄erence is given, as expected, by the lost bene￿t ￿the share of contributions that is not
converted into a pension bene￿t. Then, recalling that a higher threshold income implies more
full-time musicians, we may conclude that:
18Claim 2 In the Italian institutional setting, the presence of an actuarially unfair pension sys-
tem reduces the number of full-time musicians below the level that would prevail if the economy
were generically second-best.
In other words, if the workers in the entertainment industry received the same social security
treatment as anybody else, the gap between the actual and the e¢ cient size of the group of
full-time musicians would be reduced. This conclusion allows us to evaluate critically one of the
main demands of the Italian musicians￿union ￿namely that the speci￿city of the pension system
for the workers in the entertainment industry is removed, and that they are treated like ordinary
workers (thereby receiving as pensioners the actuarially fair value of their contributions). The
arguments put forward by the union are rooted mostly in the horizontal equity principle, stating
that agents sharing equal traits should be treated equally ￿in this case, all workers should receive
the same social security treatment. Our analysis provides a somewhat more basic argument:
reforming the pension system is needed for e¢ ciency reasons, that is for favouring the proper
functioning of the labour market. In practice, it is however di¢ cult to say whether the musicians￿
union might ￿nd the political strength to impose this reform against the short-term interest of
the ENPALS management.
Even supposing that the pension system could be changed in the above direction, and the
economy could thus be turned into a generic second-best one, e¢ ciency in the musicians￿labour
market would not be restored (see Claim 1). There is a tendency, inherent to the presence of
second-best taxation, to discourage musically talented agents from becoming full-time musicians;
this is represented by the l.h.s. of the second inequality in (34). However, there is at least a
countervailing policy instrument, the unemployment bene￿t ￿appearing on the r.h.s. of the
above-mentioned inequality; inasmuch as it provides a form of insurance against the ￿ uctuations
of the full-time musicians￿incomes, it might in principle o⁄set the negative impact brought about
by the income tax. We devote the remainder of this section to an investigation of the role of
the unemployment bene￿t as an e¢ ciency-enhancing instrument.
Restoring e¢ ciency in the second-best economy
As mentioned above, restoring e¢ ciency matters not only in the general sense that it is desir-
able to use the available resources e¢ ciently, but also as a way of ￿ghting tax avoidance: by
reducing the number of moonlighters, we can increase revenue and the general well-being of the
population.
19Now, the discussion leading to Claim 1 seems to suggest a straightforward solution to the
question of how to restore e¢ ciency in a generic second-best economy. By setting
￿ =
￿
(d￿x ￿ k(d￿)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)dx
￿
=pc; (38)
the government would be able to bring the number of agents who work as full-time musicians
to its e¢ cient level, as in this case the threshold income wSB equals the e¢ cient laissez-faire
threshold wLF ￿see (34). It remains to be seen, however, how the government can fund the
expenditure implied by the unemployment bene￿t. As public debt is not contemplated in our
model, this might be done by raising the tax rate t, or reducing the universal subsidy T; both
options could however be opposed by the ordinary workers (and by the part-time musicians).
Apparently, those who work on the ordinary labour market have all to lose and nothing to gain
from this sort of reform. This however turns out not to be entirely correct. To give a de￿nitive
answer on who gains and who loses, and hence who might oppose and who might favour the
reform, we need a more comprehensive analysis that includes the role of the public budget.
To begin with, let us write the overall public budget constraint for each period; the budget
of the social security agency does not appear explicitly, as it is always balanced by construction.





















where it is important to keep in mind that wSB is itself a function of the policy variables ￿see
above. This simply says that the revenue from taxing ordinary workers and part-time musicians
(￿rst term) plus the revenue from taxing full-time musicians (second term) must equal the total
expenditure given by the poll-subsidy and the unemployment bene￿t (third term).13
We will examine two alternative balanced-budget reforms; we raise the unemployment ben-
e￿t to reduce ine¢ ciency in the labour market, and adjust another policy instrument in such a
way that the budget equation remains satis￿ed. In one case, we adjust the universal subsidy T,
and in the other case, we adjust the tax rate t.
13This constraint applies to a generic second-best economy; in the Italian case there would be an additional
term on the revenue side, given by the musicians￿lost contributions ￿ what they have paid but not received
back. The analysis that follows is however perfectly valid also for the Italian case, as this term neither a⁄ects
the computations nor the results.
20Consider the (￿;T) reform. It must be the case that (@R=@￿)d￿ + (@R=@T)dT = 0: A few














d￿ = dT: (40)
The term in brackets represents the complete impact of a marginal change d￿ > 0 on the budget.
The direct e⁄ect is of course the increase in expenditure on existing unemployed full-time
musicians (last term, ￿pc￿SB < 0); there is also an indirect e⁄ect coming through the increase
in the threshold income and therefore in the number of full-time musicians ￿@wSB=@￿ > 0 by
(32). This will imply a larger expenditure on the unemployment bene￿t (￿pc￿ < 0) but also
a larger revenue due to the enlargement of the tax base, as ￿x ￿ wSB > 0 by (30). The total
e⁄ect is therefore not unambiguously negative as one might have expected; if the impact of the
enlargement of the tax base is su¢ ciently strong, it might even be positive, meaning that a the
marginal increase in the unemployment bene￿t determines a budget surplus, to be redistributed
uniformly to the whole population through a marginal increase in the poll-subsidy. In this case,
the reform would be Pareto-improving, because the increase in ￿ would bene￿t the full-time
musicians, and the increase in T would bene￿t everybody, as can readily be checked using (8),
(14) and (22). Clearly, a Pareto-improving reform would be politically feasible.


























where the term within brackets on the r.h.s. represents the change in revenue due to a marginal
variation in the tax rate, and it is positive. The same reasoning as in the previous case applies.
If the total e⁄ect on revenue of increasing the unemployment bene￿t is positive, then d￿ > 0
requires dt < 0; hence, it is possible to actually reduce the income tax rate and keep the budget
balanced. Again, the reform is Pareto-improving and politically feasible.
We summarise the analysis so far by stating:
Claim 3 If a marginal increase in the unemployment bene￿t triggers an increase in revenue,
it is possible, under certain circumstances, to devise a Pareto-improving reform that moves the
economy closer to the e¢ cient partition of musicians between full- and part-timers.
Clearly, this is a local result, and it needs not survive as a global result. That is to say, the
second-best optimal unemployment bene￿t might not be large enough to fully restore e¢ ciency.
21However, it is at least possible to reduce the ine¢ ciency as long as the larger number of full-
time musicians ensures an increase in revenue. It should also be noticed that, even supposing
that one could restore the e¢ cient partition of the labour market, moonlighting would not be
eliminated, as the incentives to avoid taxes remain. Thus, the unemployment bene￿t may act
as a substitute for tax enforcement, but only partially. It might however reduce the number
of moonlighting musicians to a signi￿cant extent, thereby making the usual strategies (more
inspections, heavier ￿nes, etc.) less costly and more e⁄ective.
V Discussion: sketches of Italy
What can we conclude from the above analysis? Are there lessons to be learned for the musicians￿
labour market in general, rather than for the speci￿c Italian case? These are the main questions
we want to address in these concluding remarks.
As far as Italy is concerned, we identi￿ed four plausible culprits for the sad state of a⁄airs
in the musician￿ s labour market:
￿ the high accessibility of the black market: as we saw in the Introduction, a large share
of the Italian economy is irregular, and the enforcement procedures are de￿nitely on the
lax side, hence we expect the "moonlighting condition" (19) to be satis￿ed and indeed to
exhibit a large positive value;
￿ the relatively low willingness to pay for Italian music: since musical tastes tend to be
biased towards products from the English-speaking world, Italian musicians cannot expect
to earn large sums by selling their own shows to Italian consumers, and this makes a career
as full-time musician less attractive;
￿ the low level of the unemployment bene￿t: in line with the generally "thin" nature of
the social security system, little insurance is provided against the large ￿ uctuations of the
musicians￿income, despite the fact that market-provided alternatives are not available (as
it is usually the case for this sort of risk);
￿ the presence of an actuarially unfair pension system, that forces the vast majority of
musicians to pay contributions in excess of the actual value of the bene￿ts to be received
in the future and as such is in fact strongly criticised by the musicians￿union.
22All four factors contribute, to varying extents, to make a career as professional, full-time
musician not particularly appealing and might explain the overwhelmingly irregular nature of
the labour market.
In other Western economies, these factors are not necessarily present, or not all of them
are. Tax enforcement might be su¢ ciently strict to keep the size of the black economy under
control, musical tastes might not be strongly biased towards foreign products, there might be
general programs supporting unemployed individuals, and pensions systems might be not so
grossly unfair as in the Italian case. However, at least the ￿rst factor is likely to be of some
relevance everywhere: second-best taxes do provide an incentive for musicians to moonlight,
thanks to the peculiar working hours of their job. It is therefore to be expected that some of
the talented agents decide not to take up music as a full-time profession, that is there might be
less professional musicians as there should be in an e¢ cient partition of the labour market. If
that is the case, we identi￿ed a simple policy reform that can remedy this ine¢ ciency: raising
the unemployment bene￿t will encourage more individuals to become musicians full-time. This
will in turn make more agents prone to reveal their true tax bases, and the consequent increase
in revenue might be large enough to o⁄set the costs of stepping up the unemployment program
￿might indeed generate a Pareto-improving redistribution via the tax system.
References
Adler, M., 1985, "Stardom and talent", American Economic Review 75, 208-212.
Balestrino, A. and U. Galmarini, 2003, "Imperfect tax compliance and the optimal provision of
public goods", Bulletin of Economic Research 55, 37-52.
Caserta, M. and T. Cuccia, 2001, "The supply of arts labour: towards a dynamic approach",
Journal of Cultural Economics 25, 185￿ 201.
Cowell, F., 1990a, "Tax sheltering and the cost of evasion", Oxford Economic Papers 42, 231-
243.
Cowell, F., 1990b, Cheating the government, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cowen, T. and A. Tabarrok, 2000, "An economic theory of avant-garde and popular art, or high
and low culture", Southern Economic Journal 67, 232-253.
Frank, R. and P. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society, Free Press, New York, NY.
Gri¢ ths, P., 2006, A Concise History of Western Music, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK.
23Schneider, F. and D. Enste, 2002, The Shadow Economy: An International Survey, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Myles, G., 1995, Public Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Rosen, S., 1981, "The economics of superstars", American Economic Review 71, 845-858.
Sartor, N., 2001, "The long-run e⁄ects of the Italian pension reforms", International Tax and
Public Finance 8, 83-111.
Slemrod, J., 2001, "A general model of behavioral response to taxation", International Tax and
Public Finance 8, 118-128.
Throsby, D., 1994, "A work-preference model of artist behaviour", in A. Peacock and I. Rizzo
(eds.), Cultural Economics and Cultural Policies, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, NL.
24CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009 
 
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
  
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
 
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
 
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009 
 
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 
 
2736 Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau, Fertility, Human Capital 
Accumulation, and the Pension System, July 2009 
  
2737 Hans Jarle Kind and Frank Stähler, Market Shares in Two-Sided Media Industries, July 
2009 
 
2738 Pamela Campa, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta, Gender Culture and Gender 
Gap in Employment, August 2009 
 
2739 Sebastian Gechert, Supplementary Private Health Insurance in Selected Countries: 
Lessons for EU Governments?, August 2009 
 
2740 Leif Danziger, Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage 
in Small Firms, August 2009 
 
2741 Yan Dong and John Whalley, A Third Benefit of Joint Non-OPEC Carbon Taxes: 
Transferring OPEC Monopoly Rent, August 2009 
 
2742 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni, Climate Change Mitigation 
Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action, August 2009 
 
2743 Christina Felfe, The Willingness to Pay for Job Amenities: Evidence from Mothers’ 
Return to Work, August 2009 
 
2744 Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Väth, Effort 
Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games, August 2009 
 
2745 Bruno S. Frey and Paolo Pamini, Making World Heritage Truly Global: The Culture 
Certificate Scheme, August 2009 
 
2746 Frank N. Caliendo, Is Social Security behind the Collapse of Personal Saving?, August 
2009 
 
2747 Caterina Liesegang and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals 
and Fiscal Equalization, August 2009 
 
2748 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Apostolis Pavlou, Upstream Horizontal Mergers and 
Efficiency Gains, August 2009 
 
2749 Rüdiger Pethig and Christian Wittlich, Interaction of Carbon Reduction and Green 
Energy Promotion in a Small Fossil-Fuel Importing Economy, August 2009 
 
2750 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Monetary Policy 
Transmission and House Prices: European Cross-country Evidence, August 2009 
 
2751 Olaf Posch, Explaining Output Volatility: The Case of Taxation, August 2009 
 
2752 Beatrice Scheubel, Daniel Schunk and Joachim Winter, Don’t Raise the Retirement 
Age! An Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms and East-West Differences in 
Germany, August 2009 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009  
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
 
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 